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All current forms of activity tend towards advertising and most 
exhaust themselves therein.  Not necessarily advertising itself, the 
kind that is produced as such—but the form of advertising, that of 
a simplified operational mode, vaguely seductive [and] vaguely 
consensual.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
We should be elated, we should be concerned, yet we should not 
be surprised.  Google2 can read our minds, tell us what we want to 
purchase, assist us in fulfilling our most personal and closely guarded 
desires, further our businesses, update us on current events, make 
decisions for us, educate us, and keep us healthy.  Some consumers 
“can’t think of anything [they] don’t search for.”3  The aforemen-
tioned sentiments resonate throughout an eight-minute Internet 
flash video made for the Museum of Media History entitled EPIC: 
2014, which predicts that Google will merge with Amazon.com, TiVo, 
Blogger, and various social networking tools to create the “Google 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law.  B.F.A., 2003, Web-
ster University.  The author wishes to thank Professor Frank Pasquale for his invalu-
able assistance; his parents for their continued love and support; and his friends in 
New York, New Jersey, and Atlanta.  Finally, the author wishes to thank Larry Page 
and Sergey Brin for their nonpareil research assistance. 
 1 JEAN BAUDRILLARD, Absolute Advertising, Ground-Zero Advertising, in SIMULACRA 
AND SIMULATION 87, 87 (Shelia Faria Glaser trans., Univ. of Mich. Press 1994) (1981). 
 2 While this Comment primarily concerns Google, Inc., it uses “Google” not only 
to refer to Google, Inc., but also to search engines in general. 
 3 DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, SEARCH ENGINE 
USERS: INTERNET SEARCHERS ARE CONFIDENT, SATISFIED AND TRUSTING—BUT THEY ARE 
ALSO UNAWARE AND NAÏVE 7 (Jan. 23, 2005), available at http://www.pewinternet.org 
/pdfs/PIP_Searchengine_users.pdf (A study of search engine users found that 
searchers turn to search engines “for need-to-know information [and] for trivia.”). 
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Grid.”4  In EPIC co-creator Robin Sloan’s universe, the Google Grid 
would be the most efficient information platform ever created—
allowing users to effortlessly consume and continuously produce in-
formation.5  As Sloan voices doubts that the events prophetically de-
picted in EPIC will ever come to pass,6 Google continues to assert its 
dominance in the search engine market,7 expand its corporate appa-
ratus into new ventures,8 and increase its capital at an astonishing 
rate.9  The more Google customizes its capabilities and increases its 
convenience, the greater society’s dependence on Google could be-
come.10
It is the best of times and it is the worst of times for consumers of 
all stripes.  By simply “googling” a product, the consumer has imme-
diate access to a plethora of commodities made available by online 
vendors.  From locating sneakers to securing mortgages, Google acts 
as a sophisticated concierge,11 or perhaps, more accurately, a sales as-
sistant at a store whose shelf-space is unrestricted by the economic 
limitations plaguing the brick-and-mortar crowd.12  Whether the 
searcher seeks goods, services, or information, Google makes sugges-
tions and thereby directs the consumer to the most appropriate sup-
 4 Robin Sloan, EPIC: 2014 (Museum of Media History 2004), http://epic. 
makingithappen.co.uk/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Masha Gellar, The Demise of the Fourth Estate, IMEDIA CONNECTION, Feb. 7, 2005, 
http://imediaconnection.com/content/5020.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
 7 Steve Lohr, The Risks to Google’s Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007, at C1. (“In Sep-
tember [2007,] Google’s share of Web searches in the United States was 67  
percent . . . .”). 
 8 Google recently acquired advertising giant DoubleClick for $3.1 billion. Press 
Release, Google, Google to Acquire DoubleClick (Apr. 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/doubleclick.html.  Not only does 
this purchase give Google “sole control over the largest database of user information 
the world has ever known,” but it also allows Google to “become the overwhelmingly 
dominant pipeline for all forms of online advertising.”  Senators Scrutinize Google’s Bid 
for Ad Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at C4 [hereinafter Google’s Bid]. 
 9 See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 10 Robin Sloan, Position Paper 1 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) (hypothesizing that Google could someday create Google Vote, Google Cen-
sus, Google FOIA, and Google Redistricting). 
 11 Perhaps in the case of Google’s sponsored results, Google acts more like a 
concierge who takes kickbacks from local restaurants in exchange for directing 
guests to their places of business. 
 12 See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG-TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING 
LESS OF MORE 1–10 (2006) (explaining how the low cost of reaching consumers trans-
formed the marketplace from a one-size-fits-all model to a collection of decentralized 
niche markets tailored for specialty consumers). 
CANNON (final) 2/7/2009  12:22:41 PM 
2009] COMMENT 293 
 
plier.13  However, all this convenience comes at a price: Google’s ser-
vices may be cost-free to the searcher, but the potential implications 
to the searcher’s privacy and autonomy may be drastic.  Google cata-
logues personal information about its users, keeps track of search re-
sults, and collects the search logs generated from individual user’s 
queries.14  Furthermore, the U.S. government, through either its leg-
islature or its judiciary, is doing little to restrict Google’s ability to 
profit from deceptive or incomplete search results.15
This Comment hopes to increase the dialogue surrounding 
search engine regulation.  Starting with the legal assumption that 
where there is a wrong there should be a remedy,16 this Comment as-
serts that the judicial treatment of Google as a fully protected First 
Amendment speaker is dangerous precedent.17  Google is an advertis-
ing machine, and as a publicly traded company its directors are obli-
gated to increase the value of the organization by utilizing every tool 
at its disposal to get consumers’ eyes on ads.18  In this respect, Google 
does not express an opinion in the traditional context of the First 
Amendment.  Rather, by achieving a symbiotic balance between its 
 13 Google fulfills its duty via a trade secret algorithm trademarked as PageRank.  
See Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115, 
137 n.96 (2006); Google.com, Technology Overview, http://www.google.com/ 
corporate/tech.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) (describing the PageRank Technol-
ogy). 
 14 See Gonzales v. Google Inc. 234 F.R.D. 674, 688 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that 
Google must provide the Government with an index of its search results, but that the 
individual search logs would be duplicative); see also Google.com, Google Privacy Pol-
icy, http://www.google.com/intl/en/privacypolicy.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) 
(providing a full description of Google’s privacy policies and procedures).  While pri-
vacy is not the primary concern of this Comment, it is important to note the vast 
amounts of personal data Google aggregates because, if unchecked, Google could 
readily abuse its position of power in the marketplace.  But see Microsoft v. Google: 
When Clouds Collide, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 2008, at 69–70 [hereinafter Microsoft v. 
Google]. 
 15 See, e.g., Andrew Sinclair, Note, Regulation of Paid Listings in Internet Search En-
gines: A Proposal for FTC Action, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 353, 360–62 (2004); see also, 
Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C-03-5340, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 32450, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007). 
 16 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil lib-
erty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
laws, whenever he receives an injury.”).  No doubt Chief Justice Marshall had the fol-
lowing legal maxim in mind: “ubi jus ibi remedium.” 
 17 See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007); Search 
King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at 
*12–13 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). 
 18 See infra note 90 and accompanying text.  
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clients and its users, Google is able to garner massive profits.19  
Google’s corporate interests need to be weighed against societal in-
terests such as informational reliability and informational autonomy.  
Further, the traditional free-market checks disintegrate in light of 
Google’s rather un-savvy users.20  The most visceral danger would be 
to allow Google, with its ability to tactfully and discretely manipulate 
consumers, unfettered power to subjectively control access to an im-
portant speech market.21  Finally, this Comment proposes that the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would be able to regulate Google’s 
sponsored search results under the commercial speech doctrine. 
Conceptualizing Google as a concierge service that generates 
capital from selling advertising space provides a useful framework for 
examining the role of the government in protecting consumers, pri-
vate individuals, and commercial entities from abuse.  Part II of this 
Comment provides a brief history and overview of the law of search.  
Also, using a recent study by the Pew Internet and American Life Pro-
ject,22 this Comment shows that user expectations are surreptitiously 
undermined by Google’s placement of hits on its results page.  Part 
III compares the solutions proposed by Andrew Sinclair23 and Eugene 
Volokh24 and discusses Google’s First Amendment limitations.  Part 
IV explains why Google’s service is commercial in nature and there-
fore should be regulated under the commercial speech doctrine.  Fi-
nally, Part V applies the four-factor test from Central Hudson25 and its 
progeny to Andrew Sinclair’s proposal for FTC regulation. 
 19 See Lohr, supra note 7; Posting of Miguel Helft to Bits Blog-NY 
Times.com, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/google-shares-top-600/ind 
ex.html?hp (Oct. 8, 2007, 16:11 EST).  Google’s “$144 billion market value tops that 
of Time Warner, Viacom, CBS, ad agency giant Publicis Groupe and the New York 
Times Co. combined.” Michael Barber, Google: The David or Goliath of the Media World, 
(2008), http://www.sitewire.net/newsletters/volume/3/issue/4/#googleplexed (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
 20 See infra Part II. 
 21 This Comment does not take issue with Google, Inc.’s unofficial corporate 
motto of “Don’t Be Evil.”  See Lohr, supra note 7.  However, judicial acquiescence to 
the interests of a privately controlled, culturally defining tool presents a unique 
threat to a democratic society. 
 22 FALLOWS, supra note 3. 
 23 Sinclair, supra note 15, at 369–73. 
 24 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implica-
tions of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000). 
 25 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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II. GENERAL BEWILDERMENT AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION: 
SEARCHERS ARE CONFIDENT, UNINFORMED, AND LOYAL 
Before the Internet became a ubiquity, the media were domi-
nated by several large entities controlling nearly every aspect of 
broadcast communication.  This figurative, and sometimes literal, 
monopoly imposed high entry costs for individual speakers as well as 
corporations who desired to reach consumers.  Essentially, major 
media outlets served as a filter of speech—if the speaker’s message 
was deemed fringe or otherwise unprofitable, then that person’s 
speech was excluded from broadcast and the message would not 
reach a broad audience.  Early commentators predicted that the 
Internet would “ameliorate the traditional mass-media bottleneck 
and render moot the policy and legal debate that surround[s] it.”26  
When the majority of Internet users were erudite technophiles, the 
World Wide Web was a bastion of free speech.27  Because every user 
possessed the requisite navigational knowledge, the Internet seemed 
poised to fulfill its promise as a techno-libertarian free speech uto-
pia.28
But as the saying goes, “[t]he times they are a-changin’.”29  To-
day over 1.4 billion people worldwide use the Internet,30 with each 
individual consuming goods and information.  In many circum-
stances, people use message boards, wiki-technology, or HTML to 
create their own Internet speech.  This vast quantity of both Internet 
users and Internet data presented a conundrum from a social science 
perspective. 
As the sheer density of information available online has skyrock-
eted, a user’s ability to efficiently traverse a decentralized network has 
 26 Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2008) (explaining 
high-cost entry fees). 
 27 Id. at 1157 (“[C]ommentators urged courts and policymakers to grant a high 
degree of protection to Internet speech.”). 
 28 See FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 4 (arguing that the social value of the free speech 
may have been questionable: “In the earliest days of the Internet and search engines 
. . . two of the most popular search topics were sex and technology.”). 
 29 BOB DYLAN, The Times They are A-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ 
(Columbia Records 1964). 
 30 Miniwatts Marketing Group, Internet Usage Statistics (2008), http://www. 
internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) (citing to information 
published by Nielson Net Ratings) (finding that over seventy-three percent of the 
North American population is online). 
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diminished.31  Internet users engaged in a binary game of Marco 
Polo—blindly grasping for material that they could neither sort nor 
recognize—and the search engines capitalized on this confusion.  By 
providing Internet users with a starting point, search engines greatly 
increased the utility and social value of the Internet.  As a testament 
to the practicality of search engines, current statistics indicate that 
“84% of Internet users have used search engines”32 and that “[o]n 
any given day, 56% of those online use search engines.”33  Of all the 
search engine companies, no single provider has been as successful as 
Google.34  At the current pace, nearly 400 million people per month 
start each Internet visit on Google.com.35  Google commands sixty-
four percent of all searches performed by Internet users,36 as com-
pared to its closest competitor, Yahoo.com, which only maintains 
thirteen percent of the market share.37  Like the broadcasting behe-
moths of the bygone era, Google is the primary bottleneck of our 
current informational age.38  As professors Bracha and Pasquale have 
stated, “The specter of control . . . over critical bottlenecks of infor-
mational flow threatens the openness and diversity of the Internet as 
a system of public expression.” 
Google has the power to exclude content or make an overnight 
cultural sensation.39  Its tastemaker status is solidified by its simplicity, 
and Google is widely revered for being the largest indexer of Internet 
content, currently listing over eight billion web pages.40  In recogni-
tion of Google’s impressive societal leverage, businesses reward it with 
tremendous advertising revenue; in 2006 Google generated $10.6 bil-
 31 For an excellent discussion of the rise of search engine technology and its ef-
fect on society, see Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking 
Ahead, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 201 (2006). 
 32 FALLOWS, Summary of Findings, in supra note 3, at i. “Some 84% of adult Internet 
users . . . have used search engines to help them find information on the Web.  Only 
the act of sending and receiving email . . . eclipses searching in popularity . . . .”  Id. 
at 1. 
 33 Id. (“American Internet users pose about 4 billion queries per month.”). 
 34 See Lohr, supra note 7. 
 35 See Helft, supra note 19. 
 36 Microsoft v. Google, supra note 14, at 69. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 26, at 1172. 
 39 See, e.g., Video: Tay Zonday, Chocolate Rain (April 22, 2007),  http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=EwTZ2xpQwpA (as of January 13, 2009, 33,181,166 people, 
roughly the population of Canada, had viewed Chocolate Rain). 
 40 FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 1. 
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lion in advertising fees, representing a seventy-three percent increase 
as compared to 2005.41
A brief discussion of legislative policy will help frame the issue of 
consumer protection under the Google regime.  In 1996, Congress 
passed the Telecommunications Act,42 recognizing that the “World 
Wide Web [is] a valuable source of information and medium for the 
exchange of ideas, the commercialization of  Internet navigation 
though private control of portals, gateways, browsers and search en-
gines poses new problems.”43  Congress drafted the Telecommunica-
tions Act with the intent to create a competitive market in informa-
tion technology by removing barriers to marketplace entry.44  
Ironically, the legislative goal of consumer protection45 missed the 
mark, and as predicted by Walter G. Bolter, the Telecommunications 
Act and its subsequent deregulation of the telecom markets did not 
facilitate new entry but rather “permitted the aggregation[] of eco-
nomic power.”46  A glance at the daily papers reveals that current 
market conditions continue to teeter between monopoly and compe-
tition.  A non-inclusive list of recent telecom mergers suggests that 
the balance may soon tip in favor of monopoly: AT&T recently 
merged with Media One; AOL merged with Netscape; Lycos merged 
with USA Networks; US West and Qwest recently became one; and 
Google recently acquired YouTube and added DoubleClick to its ad-
vertising arsenal.47  At least two commentators have suggested that the 
market conditions in the years immediately following the Telecom-
munications Act indicated a monumental policy failure.48
Where does this leave consumers?  Does the average consumer 
understand the broad ramifications for informational reliability 
posed by the aggregation and centralization of the most culturally de-
fining informational nexus since the Library of Alexandria?  Do con-
 41 See ANDREW GOODMAN, WINNING RESULTS WITH GOOGLE ADWORDS 21 (2d ed. 
2008). 
 42 36 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
 43 Jan H. Samoriski, Private Spaces and Public Interests: Internet Navigation, Commer-
cialism and the Fleecing of Democracy, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 93, 94 (2000). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 253 to “ensure the continued quality of tele-
communications services, and [to] safeguard the rights of consumers.”  H.R. REP. NO. 
104-458, at 126 (1996). 
 46 Walter G. Bolter, Trends in Communication: A Market and Policy Perspective, in 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: COMMON CARRIERS IN A COMPETITIVE ERA 87, 91 (1983). 
 47 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 48 Jeffery A. Eisenach & Randolph J. May, Communications Deregulation and FCC 
Reform: Finishing the Job, in COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION AND FCC REFORM 2, 2 
(Jeffery A. Eisenach & Randolph J. May eds., 2001). 
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sumers expect Google to behave as an objective reference librarian 
and, if so, what are the implications of Google’s AdWords49 program?  
Ultimately, the question for policymakers is whether the government 
should explicitly protect consumers’ expectations of objectivity in the 
online domain. 
A recent study undertaken by the Pew Internet & American Life 
Project50 demonstrates that the vast majority of searchers are confi-
dent in their ability to retrieve relevant search results.51  On the one 
hand, one could assume that search engines are performing with a 
high level of reliability and accuracy; such an assumption is not in-
consistent with Google’s high market share.52  Perhaps, Google main-
tains its market power because users are genuinely satisfied with the 
search results they receive.  However, a closer examination of empiri-
cal data indicates that the majority of users lack a sufficient under-
standing of search engine practices:53 One of every six search engine 
users are unable to distinguish between sponsored results and or-
ganic results.54  Furthermore, thirty-three percent of search engine 
users who think that search engine results are fair and unbiased are 
completely unaware of the distinction between results that are paid 
for and those that are not.55  A comparison of search engine results to 
a television broadcast, where every consumer can readily distinguish 
“between TV’s regular programming and its infomercials,”56 strongly 
suggests that the searcher’s sanguinity is inappropriate.  This leaves 
open the question of whether Google’s marketing minds, which di-
vine search engine practices, could actively manipulate consumers by 
instilling a false sense of security into their psyches. 
 49 AdWords is Google’s primary source of revenue.  Ebay to Resume Advertising on 
Google but Cuts Frequency, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2007, at C9.  It allows a business to pur-
chase specific keywords so that when a searcher enters the relevant keyword, the 
business’s webpage appears as a sponsored result.  Google.com, Google AdWords, 
https://adwords.google.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
 50 FALLOWS, supra note 3. 
 51 Id. at 8 (“Some 92% of those who use search engines say they are confident 
about their searching abilities.”). 
 52 Lohr, supra note 7. 
 53 FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 16–20. 
 54 Id. at 17.  Sponsored results are the consequence of Google accepting payment 
for placement on their results page.  Generally sponsored results appear at the top 
and on the right-hand-side of the results page.  Organic results are the hits that are 
generated by Google’s complicated search algorithm, are not paid for, and appear in 
the center of the results page. 
 55 Id. at 15. 
 56 FALLOWS, Summary of Findings, in supra note 3, at ii. 
CANNON (final) 2/7/2009  12:22:41 PM 
2009] COMMENT 299 
 
In 2001, Consumer Alert, a now defunct non-profit consumer 
protection agency, filed a complaint with the FTC alleging that 
search engines were behaving fraudulently.57  Consumer Alert stated 
that search engines, instead of simply relying upon their respective 
algorithms, were intermingling sponsored results with objective re-
sults and not providing adequate differentiation information that 
would allow consumers to distinguish the advertisement from the or-
ganic.58  The FTC agreed.  Upon Consumer Alert’s request, the FTC 
investigated and responded not by demanding that search results be 
clearer but by drafting a letter to search engine companies requesting 
that “the use of paid inclusion [be] clearly and conspicuously ex-
plained and disclosed.”59  Because of the FTC’s perfunctory regula-
tory effort, it is unsurprising that users are still generally unable to 
distinguish between the two.60
As if consumers were not already David to Google’s Goliath, an-
other more psychologically subtle issue compounds the user confu-
sion problem: brand loyalty.  In NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND 
BULLIES, Naomi Klein suggests that the grail of modern marketing is 
the inducement of brand loyalty.61  In her view, corporate marketers 
begin conditioning consumers’ minds when they are young.  Their 
mission is as multifarious in design as it is easy to execute—to create a 
loyal consumer for life.62  While this scenario may resonate with eso-
teric images of a gothic horror novel, a moment of personal reflec-
 57 Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Associate Director, Division of Advertis-
ing Practices, Federal Trade Commission, to Gary Ruskin, Executive Director, Con-
sumer Alert (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/ 
commercialalertletter.shtm. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Letter From Heather Hippsley, Acting Associate Director, Division of Advertis-
ing Practices, Federal Trade Commission, to Search Engine Companies (Jun. 27, 
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertattatch. 
shtm. 
 60 FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 17.  In the years following the FTC’s Letter to Search 
Engine Companies and their general compliance with the FTC’s proposals, sixty-two 
percent of searchers are still unable to distinguish between sponsored and organic 
results.  Id. 
 61 NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES 4–61 (2002).  In a 
nutshell, Klein argues that consumers make brand choices based on familiarity and 
“loyalty.”  In this respect, most consumers whose grade schools had Coke machines 
are Coca-Cola consumers.  She therefore argues that corporations are aware of this 
phenomenon and focus their marketing revenue towards creating brand loyalty by 
asserting their corporate presence into disparate cultural areas.  See also Ellen P. 
Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 89 (2006) (de-
scribing the branding process as embedding promotional material into media that 
otherwise appears to be independent content). 
 62 KLEIN, supra note 61, at 59–60. 
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tion reveals the premise’s veracity.  Moreover, it is difficult to break 
the brand habit; Klein argues that the majority of daily consumer de-
cisions, such as which peanut butter to purchase or, yes, which search 
engine to use, are dictated by addiction to a specific brand.63
It is reasonable to assume that Google intended to and suc-
ceeded in creating a “brand.”  Consumers no longer “search” for in-
formation on the Internet, they “google” it.64  Through the use of 
clever marketing coupled with an aesthetically pleasing user inter-
face, Google triumphed in creating a lasting, powerful brand.  This 
could account for the fact that younger users, those who literally grew 
up on the Internet, are more (troublingly) confident in and more 
(brazenly) loyal to their personal preference in search engines.65 
(Most adult users tend to favor, and consistently use, only one or two 
search engines.)66  This loyalty is most likely attributed to mere devo-
tion to an ideal as opposed to the reliability of the search results.  
Google’s users may as well be describing an Italian sports car when 
they say that they prefer Google over its competitors because it is 
“clean” and “fast.”67
Google’s users prefer Google not because of the objectivity of re-
sults, but because Google’s product is the Internet equivalent to the 
shiniest bicycle in the store.  One savvy user has troublingly re-
sponded that “I use [Google] almost exclusively because it is fast and 
accurate.  I go directly to vendor sites [from the search results page] 
 63 Id. at 90. 
 64 See Frank Ahrens, goo·gle (goo'-gul), WASH. POST, Jul. 7, 2006, at D1 (stating that 
as of July 6, 2007, the editors of Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary added the 
transitive verb “to google” into the American lexicon).  For a discussion of Google, 
Inc.’s fear that the verb “to google” will (as is already the case) refer to Internet 
searches generally and not just to searches performed at Google.com, see Frank 
Ahrens, So Google Is No Brand X, but What Is ‘Genericide’?, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2006, at 
D1. 
 65 FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 23. 
 66 See id. at 13 (stating that “44% of searchers say they regularly use a single 
search engine, while most of the rest, 48%, will use just two or three”).  It is impor-
tant to compare this figure with the fact that Google currently retains sixty-seven per-
cent of the search engine market.  Lohr, supra note 7.  These numbers suggest a de-
cidedly large percentage of Internet search engine users only use Google.  If there 
are 1.2 billion people online everyday, and fifty-six percent use the search engine 
everyday, then it is reasonable to assume that sixty-seven percent of those searching 
will use Google.  Finally, forty-four percent of all regular search engine users are loyal 
to only one provider.  FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 23.  Therefore, as a rough estimate, 
nearly 200 million search engine users are completely loyal to Google.com.  See 
FALLOWS, Summary of Findings, in supra note 3, at i; Lohr, supra note 7; Miniwatts Mar-
keting Group, supra note 30. 
 67 FALLOWS, supra note 3, at 14. 
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when I have that option.”68  While users also claim that they require 
objectivity, and that they would stop using a specific search engine if 
it used deceptive advertising practices,69 empirical data strongly sug-
gest that users are too bewildered by and loyal to their search engine 
brand of choice to adequately impose an economic market threat to 
search engine companies.  In short, so long as Google continues to 
deliver relevant results, then users will continue to maintain their loy-
alty. 
At this point, it is necessary to fully illuminate a distinction that 
will carry throughout the remainder of this Comment: there is a sub-
tle but crucial distinction between “accurate” search results and “rele-
vant” search results.  “Accuracy,” the more restrictive of the two 
words, is defined as “the condition or quality of being true, correct, 
or exact; freedom from error or defect; precision or exactness.”70  By 
contrast, “relevancy” is defined as the condition of “bearing upon or 
being connected with the matter at hand; pertinent.”71  Thus, when a 
search engine provides an “accurate” result, it is  behaving in a purely 
objective manner, one that is akin to the factual rigor consumers ex-
pect from quality newspaper reporting.  On the other hand, a “rele-
vant” search result need only be “connected” to the query, therefore 
allowing the search engine to subjectively modify the results page—
the clever placement of advertisements, for example. 
For a marketing megalodon such as Google, which tracks the 
consumption habits of its users though various electronic means, it 
will not prove difficult to proffer “relevant” results to a naïve searcher 
base: in fact, AdWords results are by their very nature simply relevant.  
Perhaps Google could maintain its market position by providing and 
placing relevant advertising.  It is far more economically onerous for 
Google to provide users with highly accurate results.  It is helpful to 
envision two concentric circles, the interior one labeled “accurate” 
and the exterior one labeled “relevant.”  Using this paradigm and 
available data, it is likely that any market response aimed at Google 
will only occur as the results approach the dubiously relevant.  To 
ameliorate the market pressure, Google merely needs to ensure that 
its search results fall somewhere short of the margins of relevancy, 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 20 (“Some 45% of searchers said they would stop using a search engine if 
they didn’t make it clear that some results were paid or sponsored.”). 
 70 RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 14 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinaf-
ter WEBSTER’S]. 
 71 Id. at 1628. 
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but it need not ensure that the results are squarely within the more 
restrictive confines of accuracy. 
 Thus, for Google to maintain its market share it need only pro-
vide users with relevant results because users, concerned primarily 
with aesthetics and relevancy, are unaware of Google’s slight of hand.  
These naïve users will probably not abandon Google because they are 
too loyal to their brand and lack the capacity to distinguish relevancy 
from accuracy.  Provided that Google continues to strive for relevancy 
in their sponsored results and advertising, it will reinforce both its 
market share and its users’ loyalty.72  What can the law do to protect 
search engine users?  Given the ironic failure of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, and the court system’s alacrity to overprotect search 
results, Google could substitute relevancy for accuracy without conse-
quence from either the economic markets or the legal community.  
The threat posed by under-regulation is twofold: first is the issue of 
consumer protection; second is the threat that unregulated search 
engines, as information bottlenecks, may pose to our contemporary 
version of the Library of Alexandria.73
III. FTC REGULATION AND FIRST AMENDMENT ABSOLUTISM:  
OPEN DOORS AND GIANT HURDLES 
A. Andrew Sinclair Proposes FTC Regulation of Google 
Andrew Sinclair was one of the earliest scholars to confront the 
issue of whether search engines should be regulated by the federal 
government.74  Sinclair proposed that two policy goals would be ad-
 72 See Sinclair, supra note 15, at 359 (citing CONSUMER WEBWATCH, A MATTER OF 
TRUST: WHAT USERS WANT FROM WEBSITES 17, http://www.consumerwebwatch. 
org/pdfs/a-matter-of-trust.pdf) (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) (“[C]onsumers . . . [are] 
unaware that they are not getting the most relevant search results.”). 
 73 The bigger they are the harder they fall. 
 74 Sinclair, supra note 15, at 360–61.  Sinclair, perhaps ignoring the flaws of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, stated that the Federal Government, and not the 
states, is positioned to regulate the Internet because the Internet is part of interstate 
commerce and therefore “demands consistent treatment that can only be achieved 
by federal regulation.”  Id. at 360.  However, an examination of the Telecommunica-
tions Act reveals that the Congress intended telecom regulation to occur at the state 
level provided the regulation is “competitively neutral.”  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458 at 
126.  The neutrality requirement is perhaps a uniformity requirement, as it would be 
difficult to conceptualize a varied regulatory scheme that would not run afoul of the 
dormant commerce clause by placing an undue burden on interstate commerce. See, 
e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (holding that Arizona’s in-
terest in protecting its businesses and consumers from deceptive packaging was not 
substantial enough to justify the burden imposed on interstate commerce). 
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vanced by federal regulation of search engine results: (1) that regula-
tion of deceptive practices would increase the searcher’s ability to lo-
cate the information for which he is looking;75 and (2) that regula-
tion would provide the searcher with a remedy for deceptive search 
engine practices.76  In order to achieve the aforementioned policy 
goals, Sinclair reasoned that either the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) or the FTC could, under their statutorily granted 
rulemaking authority, promulgate specific rules to protect consumers 
by requiring search engines to distinguish the sponsored results from 
the organic results—the relevant from the accurate.77
Sinclair identified the FTC as the appropriate regulatory body.  
Because the FTC has already asserted authority over analogous forms 
of advertising media,78 it is the best equipped to manage the problem 
of deceptive advertising practices by search engine companies.  Un-
der section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Sinclair proposes 
that the FTC require (1) that sponsored results “Contain an Identify-
ing Phrase such as ‘Paid Listing,’”79 (2) that “Paid Listings Should be 
Spatially and Colorfully Separated from Unpaid Listings,”80 and (3) 
that “Paid Listings Should Have At Least One Other Identifiable Dif-
ference” from the organic results.81  Sinclair’s hydra-headed remedy 
actually advances three policy goals—that forcing search engines to 
clearly disclose sponsorship will decrease customer confusion, in-
crease the relevance of search engine results, and provide an injured 
party with a remedy. 
Ultimately, Sinclair urged that the FTC take adjudicative action 
under his proposed rules to reduce any confusion that may arise 
among search engines as to compliance.  By so doing, the FTC will 
take a “strict stance against deceptive advertising online to match that 
against deceptive advertising on television and in print.”82  However, 
one exceptionally powerful principle obstructs Sinclair’s proposed 
 75 See Sinclair, supra note 15, at 375. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 361–64. 
 78 Id. at 360–63.  Specifically, Sinclair argues that the FTC has authority under 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2000), to regu-
late deceptive acts in which “the consumer is likely to suffer injury from a material 
misrepresentation.”  Id. (citing In re Nat’l Media Corp., Inc., 116 F.T.C. 549, 559 
(1993) (consent order)). 
 79 Id. at 369. 
 80 Sinclair, supra note 15, at 370. 
 81 Id. at 371 (This rule is intended to provide room for “search engine creativity” 
while reinforcing the “distinction between paid and unpaid links.”). 
 82 Id. at 378. 
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FTC action: the First Amendment.  Sinclair addressed the free speech 
hurdle quickly by stating the likelihood that courts would consider 
regulation of search engine results under the commercial speech 
doctrine as outlined in Central Hudson.83  In light of recent scholar-
ship,84 and the latest judicial decisions attempting to define the free-
speech component of search law,85 Sinclair’s proposal requires a 
more thorough examination. 
B. Problematic Precedent and First Amendment Absolutism  
The threshold obstacle to FTC regulation of search engines’ 
sponsored results is determining whether Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,86 and its reaffirmation of the right 
to be free from compelled speech, prohibits Sinclair’s proposed regu-
lation.  In Hurley, the Supreme Court of the United States faced the 
issue of “whether Massachusetts may require private citizens who or-
ganize a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a 
message the organizers do not wish to convey.”87  The issue came be-
fore the Court on a petition for certiorari by Hurley and the private 
organizers of the parade, the South Boston Allied War Veterans 
Council (Council).  In 1992, the respondents—members of the Bos-
ton Area Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-Sexual Organization (GLIB)—applied 
to take part in that year’s parade.88  After the Council rejected GLIB’s 
application, GLIB obtained a state court order requiring the Council 
to permit GLIB’s members to march.89  In 1993, GLIB again sought 
the Council’s permission to march in the parade, and the Council 
again denied GLIB’s request.90  GLIB filed suit in state court “alleging 
violations of the State and Federal Constitutions and of the state pub-
lic accommodations law.”91  The state trial court ruled in favor of 
 83 Id. at 363–64 (acknowledging that the “First Amendment may offer some hur-
dles to the regulation of paid search engine listings”). 
 84 See Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-
Commercial Speech, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379 (2006); Goodman, supra note 61; Volokh, su-
pra note 24. 
 85 See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007); Search 
King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193 (W.D. 
Okla. May 27, 2003). 
 86 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557 (1995). 
 87 Id. at 559. 
 88 Id. at 561. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 561.  For the full text of Massachusetts’s public accommodation law, see 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2007). 
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GLIB and held that a parade falls within the definition of a public ac-
commodation.92  In doing so, the Massachusetts court disregarded 
the Council’s argument that GLIB’s inclusion in the parade violated 
the Council’s First Amendment rights.93  The Council subsequently 
appealed the trial court’s determination to the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, which affirmed the lower court’s decision as 
not clearly erroneous.94  The state supreme court held that there was 
no expressive purpose in the parade.95  Upon an unfavorable verdict 
in the state supreme court, the Council petitioned for certiorari in 
the Supreme Court of the United States.96
GLIB’s first argument urged the Court to find that a parade does 
not contain First Amendment speech.  Writing for a unanimous 
Court, Justice Souter declared that the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court wrongly decided that a parade contains no expressive con-
duct.97  Souter stated that a parade indicates that the marchers “are 
making some sort of collective point, not just to each other but to by-
standers along the way.”98  After determining that the Council’s pa-
rade contained sufficient expression to warrant First Amendment 
protection, Justice Souter acknowledged that a parade need not have 
a “succinctly articulable message”99 to achieve First Amendment pro-
tection, and that inherent within the liberty provided by the First 
Amendment is the freedom to abstain from speaking.100  The Court 
upheld the autonomy of the speaker by stating that whatever the rea-
son for the Council’s exclusion of GLIB, “it boils down to the choice 
of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that 
choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to con-
trol.”101
Turning next to the argument that Massachusetts’s public ac-
commodation law prohibited the Council’s exclusionary action, GLIB 
 92 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561. 
 93 Id. at 563. 
 94 Id. at 564. 
 95 Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 
N.E.2d 1293, 1295–98 (Mass. 1994). 
 96 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557  
 97 Id.at 579. 
 98 Id. at 568. 
 99 Id. at 569. 
 100 Id. (citing West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)); see 
also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment 
protects the decisions of private individuals not to display “Live Free or Die” on their 
state issued license plate). 
 101 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575. 
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urged that “any tension between [the no compelled speech rule] and 
the Massachusetts law falls short of unconstitutionality.”102  In support 
of its argument, GLIB cited to Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
FCC,103 in which the United States Supreme Court refused to apply 
strict scrutiny104 in order to ameliorate “[the] potential for abuse of 
[a] private power over a central avenue of communication.”105  In 
Turner Broadcasting, Turner, the petitioner, asserted that the First 
Amendment right to abstain from speech protected the company 
from government regulation of its broadcast pursuant to the Televi-
sion Consumer Protection Act of 1992.106  The Court reasoned that 
the FCC regulation should be analyzed under Congress’s power to 
“correct market failure in a market whose commodity is speech”107 
and that congressional exercise of such power is not unconstitutional 
so long as the regulation is content neutral.108  Because the require-
ment to carry local broadcasting merely limited the ability of Turner 
to compete in economic markets,109 because it did not favor one form 
of speech over another,110 and because there was an important gov-
ernmental interest, 111 the Court analyzed whether the regulation was 
sufficiently tailored.112  However, there was a “paucity of evidence in-
 102 Id. 
 103 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
 104 Id. at 659–63. 
 105 Id. at 657. 
 106 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).  The act required cable companies, 
inter alia, to include in their transmissions local network broadcasts and qualified 
educational programming. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 630–31. 
 107 Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 640 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 316 U.S. 
1 (1945)). 
 108 Id. at 642–43. 
 109 Id. at 637.  Turner Broadcasting, however, noted that “dysfunction or failure in a 
speech market, without more, is not sufficient to shield a speech regulation from the 
First Amendment standards applicable to nonbroadcast media.”  Id. at 640.  Yet, as to 
Google and it enormous market share, there is more than a mere dysfunction in the 
speech market, there is actual customer confusion as to the nature of the results.  See 
infra notes 217–19 and accompanying text. 
 110 Specifically, the Court stated that “given cable’s long history of serving as a con-
duit for broadcast signals, there appears little risk that cable viewers would assume 
that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages en-
dorsed by the cable operator.”  Id at 656. 
 111 Id. at 662–63 (identifying three important governmental interests: “(1) preserv-
ing the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the 
widespread dissemination of information for a multiplicity of sources, and (3) pro-
moting fair competition in the market for television programming”).  Id. at 662. 
 112 Id. at 664–68. 
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dicating that broadcast television is in jeopardy,”113 and the Court 
could not determine if the regulation restricted “substantially more 
speech than necessary” to further its goals.114  Ultimately, the Court 
reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the govern-
ment and remanded the case back to the district court.115
Turning back to the Hurley decision, the Court rejected GLIB’s 
argument that Turner Broadcasting mandates the application of inter-
mediate scrutiny to the trial court’s decision that GLIB must be al-
lowed to march in the parade.116  The Court distinguished Turner 
Broadcasting on several grounds: (1) because it is likely that viewers 
would assume that the Council endorsed GLIB’s message;117 (2) be-
cause a cable operator is a “monopolistic opportunity to shut out 
some speakers”;118 and (3) GLIB could have applied for its own pa-
rade permit, and thus it failed to show that the Council had the “ca-
pacity to ‘silence the voice of competing speakers,’ as cable operators 
do.”119  Therefore, the Court applied strict scrutiny, stated that there 
was an alternative venue for GLIB’s speech, and found that forcing 
the Council to allow GLIB’s participation in the parade infringed on 
the Council’s First Amendment right to autonomy of speech.120
Because the most logical assumption is that the FTC would use 
its authority to protect consumers from injury due to deceptive adver-
tising practices, Google would likely characterize its sponsored results 
as speech protected by the First Amendment, therefore seeking to 
have the court scrutinize the FTC regulation pursuant to Hurley.  In 
order to assert a First Amendment challenge to FTC regulation, 
Google would, at a threshold level, need to show that its search re-
sults are entitled to full First Amendment free speech guarantees.  
However, it is unlikely that Google would receive full First Amend-
ment protection.  First, Hurley is distinguishable from the current 
situation with Google because a parade fundamentally differs from a 
website.  The former makes “some sort of collective point”121 because 
 113 Turner Broadcasting, at 667.  Further, it is likely that the government would be 
able to show that the search engine market, and therefore the Internet, is in jeop-
ardy.   
 114 Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 668 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 799 (1989)). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 258–59. 
 117 Id. at 576–77. 
 118 Id. at 577. 
 119 Id. at 578 (citing Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 656). 
 120 Id. at 580–81. 
 121 Id. at 568.  
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each of the marchers participate with a common goal—in the case of 
a St. Patrick’s day parade, they speak not only as individuals but also as 
a group possessing a common theme (their love for green beer?).  
Google’s search results have no such theme or unity of purpose; in 
fact, those who participate in AdWords foster no such group purpose, 
to the contrary, they all desire to standout as individual businesses, 
devoid of affiliation with a collective, free-speech goal or opinion.  In 
short, Google’s AdWords program, in its entirety, fails to capture a 
“succinctly articulable message.”122  Thus, assuming that the contours 
of any FTC disclosure rule are content neutral, the principles articu-
lated in Hurley do not prohibit the disclosure as compelled speech.123  
Because the purpose of this Comment is to advocate on behalf 
of consumer protection and potential regulation, an examination of 
a recent federal court’s treatment of Google as a speaker is also im-
portant.  Recently, in Langdon v. Google, Inc., the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Delaware, granting Google’s summary 
judgment motion, extended robust First Amendment protection to 
Google.124 Langdon, the owner of two Internet websites, 
www.NCJusticeFraud.com and www.ChinaIsEvil.com,125 alleged that 
Google refused to allow advertisements for both websites and sought 
damages and injunctive relief.126  Further, Langdon argued that 
“Google gave a fraudulent excuse for not running the [advertise-
ments], and that the reasons for refusal do not appear on [Google’s] 
website or in its ad content policy.”127  In this respect, Langdon 
claimed that Google’s refusals violated his rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.128  More specifically, he averred that the 
“rejection or acceptance of ads is based upon whether the political 
viewpoint of the ad and the related website agree with those of 
Google’s executives and employees.”129  Finally, he “allege[d] that he 
ha[d] no viable alternative other than to advertise on Defendants’ 
 122 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.  The only conceivable collective point AdWord partici-
pants are possibly making is purely for the purposes of inducing a commercial trans-
action, which favors treating the speech, in the collective, pursuant to the commer-
cial speech doctrine.  Infra note 152 and accompanying text.    
 123 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 642–43. 
 124 Langdon v. Google, Inc, 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007). 
 125 Id. at 626. 
 126 Id. at 627. 
 127 Id. at 626. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 626.  Langdon also alleged that Google’s de-listing of the NCJustice web-
site “hurt his rankings with other search engines,” and that Google’s current policy of 
allowing China to censor Google’s search results “does not allow advertisement criti-
cal of the Chinese government.”  Id. at 627. 
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search engines.”130  After a discussion of various procedural and 
pleading issues raised by the defendants arising from the plaintiff’s 
pro se status,131 the district court analyzed the defendants’ First 
Amendment Rights.132
In its defense, Google argued that granting Langdon injunctive 
“relief would compel [it] to speak in a manner deemed appropriate 
by Plaintiff and would prevent [it] from speaking in ways that Plaintiff 
dislikes.”133  Ultimately, the court agreed with Google that its First 
Amendment rights precluded the relief the plaintiff sought.134  How-
ever, instead of narrowly limiting its holding to the facts of the cur-
rent case, the district court extended remarkably broad constitutional 
protection to Google.  Essentially, the court granted Google the same 
First Amendment status as newspaper editors.135  By characterizing 
Google’s activities as that of a newspaper editor, the district court 
shielded Google from all liability stemming from its so-called editorial 
decisions.136
The district court did not need to extend such broad constitu-
tional protection to Google’s advertising and search results.  The 
court found adequate justification for Google’s action pursuant to 
the Communications Decency Act (CDA),137 which “provides 
[Google] immunity from suit from claims grounded upon their exer-
 130 Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 627. 
 131 Id. at 625–29. 
 132 Id. at 629. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 634. 
 135 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (hold-
ing that a state statute requiring newspapers to present a right of response to political 
candidates violated the First Amendment). 
 136 This is not the only case in which Google sought to classify itself as a speaker 
with a First Amendment opinion.  In Search King, Google argued that de-listing the 
plaintiff’s customer’s webpage was an act shielded from tort liability under the First 
Amendment because it was per se lawful.  Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech. Inc., No. 
CIV-01-1457-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *9 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).  The 
Search King court determined that Google’s organic search results represented an 
opinion of relevance based on keywords.  Id. at *11.  Therefore, even if Google acted 
maliciously and willfully in the de-listing of the webpages, the plaintiff was afforded 
no remedy due to freedom of speech.  Id. at *13.  However, Google does not always 
wish to style itself as a subjective speaker.  In Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wall-
paper Factory, Inc., No. C-03-5340, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 18, 2007), the plaintiff sued Google alleging that Google committed trademark 
infringement.  Google claimed that its AdWords program is completely objective, 
and that it is therefore at the mercy of the consumer who purchased the specific 
keywords.  Id. at *9 n.6.  In short, it appears that Google seeks to inconsistently char-
acterize itself when it comes to avoiding liability. 
 137 The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2000). 
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cise of editorial discretion over Internet content and editorial deci-
sions regarding screening and deletion of content from their ser-
vices”138 regardless of whether the material is constitutionally pro-
tected.139  The district court determined that based on the complaint, 
the plaintiff sought to hold Google liable for actions relating to the 
“monitoring, screening and deletion of content from their network” 
and that based on applicable case law,140 such actions are immunized 
under section 230 of the CDA.141
The plaintiff’s final relevant argument was a claim under 28 
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Google violated the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment rights by de-listing the plaintiff’s websites.142  Because 
the plaintiff could not establish that Google was a government ac-
tor,143 because the court determined that Google was not a public fo-
rum,144 and because the plaintiff had alternative venues for speech,145 
Google was not liable under section 1983.146
While it seems that Google possesses a strong constitutional ar-
gument against government regulation of its search results, even 
commentators who are staunch advocates for First Amendment abso-
lutism would probably not argue against FTC regulation of Google’s 
sponsored results.  For example, Professor Eugene Volokh argues 
that government regulation and limitations on people’s ability to dis-
seminate information about a private individual are generally im-
 138 Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 630. 
 139 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 140 Ezra v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 141 Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 630 (“Section 230 provides Google . . . immunity 
for their editorial decisions regarding screening and deletion from their network.”). 
 142 Id. at 632. 
 143 “Defendants are private, for-profit companies, not subject to constitutional free 
speech guarantees.”  Id. at 631.   However, it is also important to note that the Lang-
don court identified Google as a corporation that “uses the internet to conduct busi-
ness.”  Id. 
 144 The plaintiff argued that Google’s service was analogous to a shopping center; 
however, the analogy was misplaced for the purposes of First Amendment jurispru-
dence.  Id. at 632. 
 145 “The Court finds unavailing Plaintiff’s argument that he has no reasonable al-
ternative to advertising on the Defendant’s search engines.”  Id. 
 146 Id. at 632.  The court also dismissed the plaintiff’s Delaware free speech claim, 
the plaintiff’s claim of fraud under Delaware law, and the plaintiff’s claim of decep-
tive business practices under Delaware law.  Id. at 632–35.  The state free speech 
claim was dismissed because the court determined that the reaches of the Delaware 
Constitution are identical to the Federal Constitution; the court dismissed the fraud 
claim because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the intent to induce element; and finally, 
the court dismissed the deceptive business practice claim because, under Delaware 
law, there is no private right of action for deceptive business practices.  Id. 
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permissible unless they are rooted in several narrow exceptions.147  
First, Volokh states that speech restrictions based on contract be-
tween the potential speaker and the individual subject are constitu-
tional under Cohen v. Cowles Media.148  Second, Volokh finds little 
worry with regulation of speech that cuts to the heart of the commer-
cial speech doctrine.149  Therefore, if Google’s AdWords are “com-
mercial speech,” as is likely the case, then the FTC could require 
Google to clearly disclose that such speech was paid for, provided the 
speech has the propensity to deceive.150
To Volokh, and, by extension, to other First Amendment abso-
lutists, the commercial speech doctrine is a relatively non-threatening 
exception to robust speech protection.151  Presumably, this exception 
is permissible because it is a constitutional form of consumer protec-
tion.  As Volokh states, “the Court’s most common definition of 
commercial speech is speech that explicitly or implicitly ‘propose[s] a 
commercial transaction.’”152  An advertisement seeking to induce a 
consumer to enter into a financial transaction in exchange for goods 
or services would be the classic model of commercial speech.  Hypo-
thetically, a business might say, “Our widgets are made with only one-
hundred percent post-consumer recycled materials.”  If it turns out 
that the widget is actually produced from one hundred percent mer-
cury, then clearly the commercial speech doctrine would allow the 
FTC to forbid the company from airing this advertisement under sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act153 because it is likely that 
the consumer would suffer injury from the company’s material mis-
representation.154
Volokh goes on to contrast commercial speech with situations 
regarding data privacy that are only tangentially related to this Com-
ment.  He states that when a corporation offers to sell information 
about its consumers to another interested corporation, this transac-
tion in data cannot be constitutionally regulated under a properly 
framed commercial speech doctrine.155  The principle underlying this 
formulation of the doctrine is that such speech does not implicate 
 147 Volokh, supra note 24. 
 148 Id. at 1057 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991)). 
 149 Id. at 1079–87. 
 150 Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 151 See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1079–87. 
 152 Id. at 1081. 
 153 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Volokh, supra note 24, at 1085. 
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“fraud in a particular commercial transaction,”156 and in Volokh’s 
view the implication of fraud is the primary justification for the regu-
lation of commercial speech.157  This Comment argues that common-
law fraud does not adequately protect consumers’ interest in the 
Internet in that fraud is not intended to nor capable of correcting a 
market that is on the verge of monopoly.158
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF GOOGLE’S SPONSORED RESULTS:  
EDITOR OR ADVERTISER? 
A. Regulatory Goals in a Monopoly Market 
The regulation of advertisement under the commercial speech 
doctrine is a rather broadly drawn exception to First Amendment 
protections.  The policy rests upon the notion that the corporation 
has far greater access to information about its goods or services than 
does the consumer; therefore, the corporation is situated to poten-
tially cause harm to public heath and welfare if it engages in decep-
tive speech.159  Deceptive advertising poses an anticompetitive effect 
because it can, in a saturated market, create barriers to entry for po-
tential competitors, such as high entry costs.  The commercial speech 
doctrine is a method of protecting competition in the marketplace by 
allowing regulation of deceptive advertising. 
Assume that Alex Corporation (A), a newcomer in the industry, 
and Bain Corporation (B), who controls seventy percent of the mar-
ket-share, both produce economy-class automobiles.  In order to gain 
a commercial advantage over B, A decides to launch a nationwide 
newspaper advertising campaign.  Suppose that, in an isolated inci-
dent, one of B’s cars spontaneously combusted, although no one was 
injured.  In order to capitalize on B’s misfortune, A publishes photo-
graphs showing B’s auto-flambé from various angles so as to create 
the impression that a substantial number of B’s cars inevitably end up 
in flames.  Also on the page is a statement reading “Alex’s Cars Won’t 
 156 Id. at 1082. 
 157 However, under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the agency does not need 
to prove actual fraud to regulate the applicable industry; it need only to show that 
the advertising in question has the propensity to deceive.  Infra note 209 and accom-
panying text. 
 158 This Comment uses the word “monopoly” not as a term of art pursuant to the 
law of antitrust.  Instead, “monopoly” is to be understood in the context of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Turner Broadcasting.  See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 661–62 (1994). 
 159 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 
(1980). 
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Kill You.”  Without the commercial speech doctrine, this type of ad-
vertising would be permissible speech; further, if a private individual 
published the exact same treatment, the First Amendment would bar 
the government from regulating the information.160
A commercial enterprise understands that when it advertises, 
and thereby promotes a commercial transaction, it is subject to po-
tential government regulation if the advertisement is more likely to 
mislead the consumer than to inform161 and if there is a likelihood of 
injury to the consumer.162  The commercial speech doctrine protects 
competition by permitting the government to regulate a direct or in-
direct attack on other businesses by deceiving consumers—such at-
tacks may go beyond rigorous competition and thus become anti-
competitive, especially when the actor enjoys significant market 
power.163  Further, FTC regulation is intended to place businesses on 
a somewhat equal footing when it comes to their ability to propose 
commercial transactions; it prevents a dominant firm from mislead-
ing consumers as to a competitor’s product, an act that may harm 
competition by preventing or discouraging new market entry.  It also 
places businesses on level ground, because once an FTC regulation is 
in place, it prohibits businesses from falling below the FTC standard, 
thereby protecting the communications medium itself.  Given 
Google’s significant market share and its consumer loyalty, it is not 
unfathomable to assume that their deceptive advertising practices 
may be intended to have an anticompetitive effect on the search en-
gine market. 
An obvious, yet disputed, anticompetitive effect is called “free-
riding.”  Free-riding, in its most common form, is generally not con-
sidered to be anticompetitive because it may have a positive effect on 
consumer prices.  However, the form of free-riding that this Com-
ment suggests that Google is engaging in is, in many ways, the con-
verse to the traditional free-rider model.  Google is inducing advertis-
ers to free-ride on its dominance.  This is best illustrated by an 
example.  Imagine a world where only some TV stations disclose that 
“the following is a paid advertisement.”164  An obvious problem pre-
 160 See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1086 (explaining that when consumers leaflet 
against a shoddy developer, the leafleters are entitled to full protection under the 
First Amendment because their speech does not propose a commercial transaction). 
 161 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See, e.g., Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc, 547 U.S. 28 (2006); 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).  
 164 This is the common disclaimer placed before an infomercial on network televi-
sion because sponsorship law actually requires “broadcasters to identify those who 
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sented by this is that consumers may assume that an infomercial,165 on 
a station that does not post such a disclaimer, is actually news pro-
gramming166 and therefore endorsed by the station itself or at least 
subject to fact checking and objectivity.167  In short, the network 
committed the “accuracy/relevancy” substitution.  Furthermore, 
there are downstream effects likely to affect competition.168  First, 
businesses will be more motivated to advertise with the network that 
does not post the disclaimer and therefore, by piggybacking on the 
goodwill of the network’s news division, increase its sales through de-
ceptive practices.169  The network will benefit from the windfall in ad-
vertising revenue, reinvest into its standard programming in an effort 
to increase its goodwill among viewers, and be better positioned to 
charge supercompetitive fees for its infomercial air space and, vis-à-vis 
its market power, implement barriers to entry.  
In a market dominated by advertisers freeloading on the net-
work’s respectability, all the networks will likely, in an effort to re-
main competitive, conceptualize new ways to sell advertising in a de-
ceptive manner.  The television media would become entangled in a 
cut-throat race to the bottom where all providers struggle to achieve 
the most profitable business model, perhaps at the expense of the 
consumer.170  Placing economic interests above quality and accuracy 
will harm consumers because the variety and veracity of network pro-
gramming will be reduced.  Society as a whole is damaged when a 
speaker inculcates the gravity of his raw message with the advertising 
pay for program material,” and provides penalties for those broadcasters who do not.  
Goodman, supra note 61, at 64 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 317(a)(1), 508 (2000)). 
 165 Disclosure requirements under The Communications Act of 1996 do not apply 
to obvious marketing such as the “traditional fifteen- or thirty-second spot advertise-
ments, where both presence and source of sponsorship are obvious.”  Id. at 97. 
 166 This of course assumes that the advertiser is using a news-type format for its 
infomercial. 
 167 This is a classic example of what Ellen P. Goodman described as “stealth mar-
keting.”  She stated, “American mass media law has long been hostile to stealth mar-
keting.  It is illegal . . . for a record company to make secret payments to radio sta-
tions to play music . . . or for an advertiser or organization to pay broadcasters to 
feature products . . . without identifying the sponsor.”  Id. at 84; cf. id. at 91 (describ-
ing how sponsors “sometimes pay for ‘secured placement’ of their footage to achieve 
a kind of ‘branded’ journalism”). 
 168 Id. at 100–04. 
 169 In his article, Volokh argues that there is nothing inherently wrong with busi-
nesses taking a free ride on the work of others.  Volokh, supra note 24, at 1074.  How-
ever, Volokh addresses this problem only by proposing that giving consumers a prop-
erty right in their personal information would be economically inefficient.  Id.  He 
does not address the problem freeriding presents to communications media under 
the commercial speech doctrine. 
 170 Goodman, supra note 61, at 87. 
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sheen, and he becomes a mouthpiece for the “simplified operational 
mode.”171
Dressing up an assumedly objective system, such as Google, with 
advertising’s nebulous simplicity gravely shifts consumer expectations 
from accuracy to relevancy, and this shift will bleed the medium itself.  
Briefly outlined, the argument is as follows: consumers, initially ex-
pecting objectivity from Google yet aware of the presence of advertis-
ing, will begin to believe that everything appearing on the results 
page is an advertisement.  Even a subtle relocation of consumer ex-
pectations creates a strong economic incentive for advertisers to con-
tinually refine their use of covert advertising methods to remain one 
step ahead of skeptical consumers.  Ultimately, not only the message, 
but the Internet itself (as a medium) will suffer because it has be-
come completely diluted with deceptive advertising.172  When con-
sumers are unable to differentiate between advertising and informa-
tion unclouded by economic incentives,173 the FTC should act to 
protect the channels and instrumentalities of communication—
especially when the medium is recognized as crucial to promoting 
the interests of a democratic society.  By eliminating an advertiser’s 
ability to piggyback on the broadcaster’s reliability, the FTC protects 
consumers and the integrity of a complex operational mode from un-
scrupulously simplistic media providers. 
A tension undoubtedly exists between Google’s editorial free-
dom and the right of a sovereign to police the channels of speech.  In 
addressing this tension, it is important to determine whether the 
Langdon court correctly classified Google as a newspaper editor, or 
whether Google is more akin to something else: a purely commercial 
speaker.  However, the implications of characterizing Google as a 
newspaper or as a broadcaster do not preclude the federal govern-
ment’s ability to regulate Google.174  This classification is only deter-
minative of which federal agency is best situated to promulgate rules.  
Because this Comment addresses only whether regulation is permis-
 171 BAUDRILLARD, supra note 1. 
 172 Goodman, supra note 61, at 104–08 (stating that the only wholly satisfying pol-
icy justification for regulation of deceptive advertising is that “over-
commercialization” will “hijack[] authentic culture and turn[] ‘America’s market-
place of idea’s [into] . . . a junkyard of commodity ideology.’”). 
 173 Id. at 110 (“The purpose of stealth marketing is to bypass audience resistance 
to promotional messages by giving an erroneous impression of source.”). 
 174 Even if the Langdon court was correct in extending newspaper-like editorial 
status to Google, the FCC could still require clear sponsorship disclosure under the 
Federal Communications Act of 1934.  See, e.g., Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 
2d 622 (D. Del. 2007). 
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sible and appropriate, there is no discussion of whether the FTC175 or 
the FCC176 is better positioned to confront the consumer protection 
issue in the context of cyberspace.  Further, it is important to note 
that this Comment assumes that application of advertising source dis-
closure rules will not damage discourse because the cost to Google, as 
a speaker and as a business, is minimal.177
B. Google Is a Commercial Speaker Because Its Primary Corporate 
Purpose Is to Further Commercial Transactions 
This Comment adopts the rationale presented in an article by 
Tom Bennigson.178  His basic premise is simple: a commercial entity 
that is publicly traded on a national market cannot be anything other 
than a commercial speaker.179
In support of his argument, Bennigson first looks to the fiduci-
ary obligations of directors and managers of a corporation.180  In 
American corporate law, the managers have a duty to the sharehold-
ers to increase the value of the corporation as a whole.  In this re-
spect, a shareholder may bring a derivative action challenging the 
decision of a manager who uses the corporate treasury for an activity 
constituting a breach of the duty of care or a breach of the duty of 
loyalty.  It is the primary concern of the managers of the company to 
increase the value of the shareholders’ stock, and any action which 
deviates from this premise could be considered corporate waste and 
therefore subject to a derivative suit for breach of the duty of care or 
loyalty. 
This analysis begs the question of the permissible scope of the 
manager’s decision-making abilities.  The corporate manager is duty 
bound to increase the revenue of the corporation.  In order to ac-
complish this task, the manager needs to induce consumers to enter 
 175 For a discussion advocating on behalf of FTC regulation, see Sinclair, supra 
note 15, at 360–64 (discussing which regulatory body is best suited to regulate search 
engines, and concluding that the FTC is the appropriate arm of government). 
 176 The Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2000) (requiring 
broadcast stations to disclose the identity of sponsors when any type of “valuable con-
sideration is directly or indirectly paid or promised, charged or accepted”). 
 177 This presumption is evidenced by the fact that disclosure regulations of broad-
cast radio and television did not damage speech at large.  See Volokh, supra note 24, 
at 1112; see id. at 1052 (arguing that favoring data privacy over First Amendment ab-
solutism will provide courts with dangerous precedent which could be used to sup-
press speech that was once protected but interferes with various civil rights). 
 178 Bennigson, supra note 84. 
 179 Id. at 383. 
 180 Id. at 393–96. 
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into a financial transaction with the business.  The directors’ respon-
sibility to shareholders is not without limits.  As stated earlier in this 
Comment, a business engages in corporate speech when the purpose 
of the speech in question is primarily to induce a commercial transac-
tion.181  By examining the Supreme Court’s rationale for providing 
lesser protection for commercial speech, Bennigson concludes that 
commercial speech is entitled to lower scrutiny because it implicates 
only the speech interests of the listener—i.e., the corporate speaker’s 
interest is not expressive.182  In determining whether speech should 
be considered commercial pursuant to the First Amendment, the 
Court looks to whether the speech is “motivated solely by the 
speaker’s economic interests and is related to furthering commercial 
transactions.”183
The question thus becomes whether Google’s sponsored results 
should be considered commercial speech. The first prong of the com-
mercial speech analysis is whether Google’s sponsored results are 
solely motivated by the economic interests of the corporation.184  At 
first blush, it seems evident that Google’s AdWords program serves 
no other purpose than to generate revenue for shareholders.  As 
stated earlier in this Comment, Google generated $10.6 billion in ad-
vertising revenue in 2006.185  However, the mere fact that a category 
of speech is profitable should not be dispositive for a finding that the 
speech is commercial.186  There are several instances where a speaker 
may have a mere scintilla of motivation not related to economic in-
terests.  A newspaper certainly desires a profit for its efforts, however 
there is a clear dual purpose: newspapers also desire to be the most 
readable, the most erudite, or the most groundbreaking—they strive 
for accuracy.  Google’s AdWords program, by contrast, has no such 
secondary concerns.  Their goal is to place relevant advertising—
 181 Volokh, supra note 24, 1081–82. 
 182 In support of this argument, Bennigson cites to the recent string of cases limit-
ing a corporation’s ability to fund political campaigns.  He states that because the 
corporation is made of stockholders, it would be illogical to assume that corporate 
donations represent the political voices of the individual shareholders.  Bennigson, 
supra note 84, at 401.  Therefore, even corporate political contributions are not fully 
protected under the First Amendment.  Id. at 402–04.  Also, under the GLIB ration-
ale, a speech may be considered controllable if it has no expressive purpose.  See 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 N.E.2d 
1293, 1295–98 (Mass. 1994). 
 183 Bennigson, supra note 84, at 395. 
 184 Id. at 388 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557, 561 (1980)). 
 185 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 186 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975). 
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under the Hurley rationale, Google’s purpose is fundamentally non-
expressive, and is not afforded full First Amendment protection.187  
Therefore, the editorial content of a newspaper is substantially dis-
tinguishable from the editorial control Google asserts over its Ad-
Words program: one strives for accuracy and the other simple rele-
vance. 
Likewise, Google does exhibit a motivation that superficially ap-
pears without economic incentives with respect to AdWords.  Google 
seeks to provide its users with relevant information based on the key-
words they enter.188  However, while it is obviously tempting to equate 
such relevancy with the accuracy newspapers strive to achieve,189 
Google, as an advertising entity, does not retain the same societal in-
terests as the editor of a newspaper.  Google’s AdWords seek to put 
the most relevant commercial vendor at the top of the search results 
list.  By engaging in this practice, Google signals to potential busi-
nesses that they will get the most receptive eyes on the business’s ad-
vertisements.190  At its bare essence, Google’s struggle for relevancy is 
motivated not by a puritanical desire to accurately report on the cur-
rent state of commerce,191 but rather to leverage businesses into pur-
chasing advertising space on Google192—this is not expressive con-
duct. 
 187 See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.  
 188 See Google.com, Welcome To AdWords, https://adwords.google.com (last vis-
ited Jan. 13, 2009) (“When people search on Google using one of your keywords, 
your ad may appear next to the search results.  Now you’re advertising to an audi-
ence that’s already interested in you.”). 
 189 See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007); Search 
King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193 at 
*12–13 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). 
 190 Thus, Google tacitly admits that the primary purpose of AdWords is to forward 
it’s own economic interests, thereby subjecting the AdWords program to regulation.  
See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 191 See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1052 (discussing how a broadened commercial 
speech doctrine may serve to restrict speech by consumers on economic matters).  
Volokh’s analysis, however, is mooted by Bennigson’s suggestion that courts consider 
both the corporation’s motivation for speaking as well as the inducement require-
ment.  See Bennigson, supra note 84, at 396. 
 192 This Comment recognizes that there exists a gray area as to whether the cor-
porate speaker is motivated solely by commercial interests.  Take for example a radio 
disc jockey that knows that when he plays certain songs it is likely that the radio sta-
tion will garner more profits through advertising revenue.  A situation such as this 
illustrates the potential dangers of examining the speaker’s motivation.  Fortunately 
for the courts, Congress drafted section 317 of the Communications Act which states 
that such editorial decisions may only be regulated when any type of “valuable con-
sideration is directly or indirectly paid or promised, charged or accepted” in ex-
change for playing the song.  47 U.S.C. § 317 (2000). 
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Google’s own business plan, advertising, strongly evidences a 
comfortable fit within the second prong of the commercial speech 
analysis.193  It is clear that Google’s AdWords are intended to induce 
the consumer into making a commercial transaction.  In the first in-
stance, Google puts eyes on the advertisements and uses this ability to 
attract businesses to enter into an advertising agreement with Goo-
gle.194  Therefore, if a court were to require that the commercial 
transaction induced needs to flow directly between the consumer and 
the corporate speaker, this prong would be met.  However, it seems 
that inducement into any commercial transaction would be sufficient 
to sustain a finding that Google’s AdWords are commercial speech. 
For example, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,195 the Su-
preme Court treated a condom manufacturer’s informational pam-
phlet concerning the dangers of sexually transmitted diseases as 
commercial speech.196  The manufacturer argued that this was a 
purely informational packet designed to inform the public about the 
potential dangers of unprotected sexual intercourse.197 The Court 
found that this pamphlet was designed to induce the sexually active 
consumer into a commercial transaction and therefore considered 
the flyer commercial speech.198  Presumably, the Court does not re-
quire the benefit to actually come from the consumer directly to the 
corporate speaker—simply “educating” the public about STDs could 
increase the total volume of condom sales, thereby increasing the 
revenue generated by the corporate speaker. 
Google’s AdWords may not directly induce a commercial trans-
action with Google; however, the purpose of placing third-party ad-
vertising in front of potentially willing consumers certainly is in-
tended to induce the consumer to engage in a commercial 
transaction with the third-party business.  By increasing the visibility 
of advertising, Google hopes to maximize the number of sales made 
by the third-party advertisers and thereby increase the number of par-
 193 Bennigson, supra note 84, at 396. 
 194 Google is currently developing Google Trends, a device that is putatively de-
signed to assist businesses in choosing AdWords that have a high search volume.  If a 
potential advertiser wishes to see how many searches for a term occurred within a 
time period and within a certain geographical area, it can do so.  From that informa-
tion, the advertiser can make an educated decision regarding what words to pur-
chase.  See Google Trends, http://www.google.com/trends (last visited Jan. 13, 
2009). 
 195 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
 196 Id. at 61. 
 197 Id. at 62. 
 198 Id. at 66–67. 
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ticipants in AdWords.  Finally, an increase in AdWords sales would 
benefit Google by increasing revenue and ultimately the value of the 
shareholder’s stake in the corporation.199  As shown above, this form 
of profit maximization may have significant anticompetitive effects, 
such as barriers to entry and the potential destruction of an entire 
market. 
Free speech absolutists, who favor the holding in Langdon, argue 
that the First Amendment should afford newspaper-like protection to 
Google in order to ensure the diversity of viewpoints in the market-
place.  Yet the primary justification for granting commercial speech 
intermediate scrutiny is to “suggest that a different degree of protec-
tion is necessary to [e]nsure that the flow of truthful and legitimate 
commercial information is unimpaired.”200  Beyond using this state-
ment to support the constitutionality of FTC regulation of search en-
gines, the court’s reasoning indicates that FTC regulation may fur-
ther promote the commercial speech doctrine’s underlying 
principles by ensuring that consumers have access to information 
which is truthful and accurate before entering into a commercial 
transaction.  This argument assumes that there is true competition in 
the search engine market.  However, it is evident that the search en-
gine market is malfunctioning for several reasons.201
First, the power that search engines wield as Internet gatekeep-
ers affords them abundantly broad discretion in imposing barriers to 
entry for potential speakers.  This problem manifests itself in 
Google’s AdWords program because the more necessary online ad-
vertising becomes to business success,202 the more expensive the Ad-
Words will become.  Second, customer confusion regarding whether 
a search result is actually sponsored exacerbates the danger of the 
Internet becoming nothing other than an indexed repository for ad-
vertising.  In this respect, opening the door to potential federal dis-
closure regulation will reduce consumer confusion, and promote the 
 199 Sinclair’s proposed regulation would not be contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
rationale in Turner.  There the Court stated that forced speech is permissible because 
it only limits the speaker’s ability to compete in an economic market.  Turner Broad. 
Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994).  In this respect, by forcing Google and 
other search engines to disclose their paid advertisements, the FTC would not limit 
Google’s expression, but only its ability to reap the benefits of an anticompetive, de-
ceptive economic scheme.  See id. 
 200 Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977) (citing Virginia 
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 
(1975)). 
 201 See supra Part III. 
 202 Pasquale, supra note 13, at 130–34. 
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acutely democratic free speech utopia promised by early Internet ad-
vocates.  Regulation of search engine advertising promotes democ-
ratic ideals by reducing entry costs for potential speakers and protect-
ing the diversity of Internet speech.203  Finally, because Google’s 
speech is (properly) refashioned as commercial, there is constitu-
tional room for federal regulation, even regulation that forces 
Google, through narrow means, to “speak.” 
V. SOLUTION: APPLYING SINCLAIR’S PROPOSAL TO  
CENTRAL HUDSON AND 44 LIQUORMART 
Sinclair’s Comment provides an excellent framework from 
which to begin a discussion of regulating Google. Sinclair, undoubt-
edly eager to discuss potential regulation, only briefly addresses the 
“First Amendment . . . hurdles to the regulation of paid search en-
gine listings”204 by stating that sponsored results are “probably ex-
empt[] . . . from First Amendment protection.”205  While Sinclair 
deems the commercial speech doctrine the appropriate legal portal 
through which the FTC could regulate Google, there are lingering 
difficulties.  The most apparent dilemma is whether Google’s actions 
are sufficiently deceptive to warrant an FTC rulemaking.  If so, the 
question must become whether any FTC rule aimed at Google would 
survive under Central Hudson and its progeny.  This section addresses 
both of the aforementioned issues and then considers whether regu-
lating Google is a wise policy choice. 
A. FTC Regulatory Policy 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act makes unlawful 
the use of deceptive acts or practices.206  While the FTC has never 
promulgated a single, definitive statement as to the FTC Act’s warrant 
against deception, “[c]ertain elements undergird all deception 
 203 As a caveat, it is important to note that Google’s AdWords program does not 
represent a “mixed” form of commercial and non-commercial speech.  The sole pur-
pose of the AdWords expression within the AdWords campaign is to effectuate 
commercial transactions with third party vendors.  This is not analogous to the situa-
tion the Court faced in Nike, where the dissenting Justices reasoned that a mixed 
form of speech may require a delicate regulatory scheme in order to pass constitu-
tional muster.  Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 676–77 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). 
 204 Sinclair, supra note 15, at 364. 
 205 Id. 
 206 15 U.S.C. §41(a) (2000). 
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cases.”207  The initial question the FTC must answer before it exercises 
its jurisdiction under section 5 is whether there is a practice that is 
likely to mislead the consumer.  Under this analysis, the “entire . . . 
course of dealing will be considered,”208 and the inquiry is “whether 
the act or practice is likely to mislead, rather than whether it causes 
actual deception.”209  Judicial analysis directly tracks the FTC’s policy 
statement; in an interpretation of section 5, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that “the likelihood or pro-
pensity of deception is the criterion by which advertising is meas-
ured.”210  Since the FTC’s inception, various courts have looked upon 
its plenary authority to regulate deceptive practices regardless of the 
seller’s scienter.  In an early opinion, the Supreme Court held that a 
seller’s innocent mislabeling of his wood as “white pine” did not ab-
solve liability under the FTC Act, provided that the seller’s actions 
have a propensity to deceive consumers.211  In so holding, the Court 
noted that “competition may be unfair within the meaning of this 
statute and within the scope of the discretionary powers conferred on 
the [FTC], though the practice condemned does not amount to 
fraud as understood in [common law].”212
Case law and the FTC’s own policy statements verify the proposi-
tion that the seller’s intent is irrelevant to deception.  Abundant case 
law indicates that proof of actual deception is not necessary, but may 
be sufficient, under the FTC Act.213  Case law also labels section 5 as a 
prophylactic measure against deception.214  So long as the consumer 
is likely to be deceived by an entire course of dealing, the FTC pos-
sesses the authority to impose consumer protection regulation.215  In 
many instances however, the FTC is positioned to provide actual evi-
 207 HON. BOB PACKWOOD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON 
DECEPTION, reprinted in DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION 
& THE LAW 826 (2007). 
 208 Id. at 828. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 211 FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934). 
 212 Id. 
 213 See Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977); U.S. Retail 
Credit Ass’n v. FTC, 300 F.2d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 1962); Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 
369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943); In re Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984). 
 214 FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 699, 674 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 215 The policy rationale for judicial acquiescence to FTC regulation in the absence 
of evidence of actual confusion is two-fold.  First, the courts defer to the expertise of 
the administrative body. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 207, at 770.  Second, im-
posing a requirement of proof of actual consumer confusion would be “costly and 
inefficient.”  Id. 
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dence of consumer deception.  In a survey of case law, Pridgen and 
Alderman demonstrate that courts routinely uphold FTC regulation 
when between thirteen and twenty percent of consumers were actu-
ally mislead by the advertiser’s conduct.216
At the current time, it is impossible to gauge with sufficient ac-
curacy the exact percentage of Google users who are deceived into 
clicking on advertisements.  The most accurate estimate of deception 
originates in the Pew study.217  Pew found that one out of six, or 
roughly seventeen percent, of Internet search engine users are un-
able to distinguish between sponsored and organic results.218  Given 
the empirical data, it appears that the FTC would be free to regulate 
pursuant to a showing of actual consumer deception.219  Under the 
“entire course of dealing” analysis, the FTC could easily find that 
Google is likely to mislead consumers into thinking that sponsored 
results are accurate, organic results. 
On January 18, 2009, a Google search for “shoes” revealed that 
the search results yield a likelihood of deception.  Google does not 
spatially separate three sponsored results from the organic results.  
Google does make an effort to distinguish between the two, but this 
half-hearted attempt does not cure the results page of its deceptive 
nature.  The first three results are positioned directly above the or-
ganic results; the typeface is identical as between the two; and while 
“sponsored result” does appear in the vicinity of the advertisements, 
the color discreetly blends into the background and is almost imper-
ceptible to a reasonable user.220  Further, the term “sponsored results” 
is placed on a separate visual plane from the results themselves.  Even 
the term “sponsored results” does not necessarily indicate that the re-
sults are paid for: the first definition of the verb “to sponsor” is, 
“promise, vouch, or answer for.”221  Google hardly “vouches” for the 
AdWords participants, in fact, as shown in American Blind, Google dis-
 216 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 207, at 771 (citing In re Benrus Watch Co., 
352 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1965); See In re Book of the Month Club, 202 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 
1952)). 
 217 FALLOWS, supra note 3. 
 218 Id. at 17. 
 219 The Pew Study’s seventeen percent number may actually be underinclusive be-
cause it only addresses the number of people who are unaware of search engine’s 
practice of including sponsored results.  Their data does not incorporate the portion 
of the public who are aware of the practice, but unaware of where those results ap-
pear. 
 220 The reasonable consumer is the modern guidepost for judicial analysis of an 
FTC finding of deception.  PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 207, at 777–81. 
 221 WEBSTER’S, supra note 70, at 1843.   
CANNON (final) 2/7/2009  12:22:41 PM 
324 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:291 
 
tances itself from its advertisers.222  Distancing oneself from his copy is 
not consistent with the actions of a newspaper editor, who tradition-
ally stands by (vouches for) his stories.  Therefore, Google, by its own 
actions, acts not like a newspaper editor but like a disinterested com-
piler of advertisements, and full First Amendment protection is un-
warranted and unnecessary.  Regardless of whether the FTC chooses 
to present direct evidence of deception, or whether they proceed 
with their discretionary authority to regulate under the “likely to de-
ceive” doctrine, the FTC could confidently assert jurisdiction over 
Google.223
Another framework under which the FTC could pursue regula-
tion of Google is the deception by omission analysis.  In order for an 
omission to be misleading the speaker must omit a material fact.224  
As stated by Pridgen and Alderman, omissions may arise from the 
“ordinary consumer’s assumptions about a product that are simply 
not corrected by the advertisement.”225  The closest test for materiality 
under the FTC act appears in 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1), which states that 
an omission is material if  “the extent to which the advertisement fails 
to reveal facts material in the light of such representations or material 
with respect to consequences which may result . . . under such condi-
tions as are customary or usual.”226  The FTC has illuminated various 
instances where there is a presumption of deception by omission.  
The most pertinent for Google is the presumption of deception that 
is created when there is an omission as to the nature of the product. 
The FTC and the courts have construed deception as to the “na-
ture of the product” quite liberally.  A non-exhaustive list of various 
rules concerning nature of the product deception includes labeling 
as to the size of sleeping bags,227 labeling indicating that a seat belt is 
not actually composed of leather,228 labeling as to the length of an ex-
tended ladder,229 and labeling disclosing the size of a tablecloth.230  By 
 222 Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., C-03-5340, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 32450, *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007). 
 223 FTC findings of deception are sufficient for the agency to exert regulation over 
an advertiser.  See supra note 216 and accompanying text.  “Moreover, uncontradicted 
evidence of experts or consumers that there was no actual deception in particular 
cases has been deemed insufficient to overcome the Commission’s conclusion that 
there was a tendency or capacity to deceive.”  PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 207, 
at 771. 
 224 J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
 225 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 207, at 880–81. 
 226 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (2000). 
 227 16 C.F.R. § 400 (1985). 
 228 Id. § 405. 
 229 Id. § 481. 
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analogy, the aforementioned regulations are miniscule in potential 
detriment to the consumer when compared to Google’s failure to 
adequately disclose which search results are sponsored.231  Finally, 
each of these regulations could be characterized as forced speech.  
Such regulation would be unconstitutional but for the fact that the 
rule is imposed upon a commercial speaker.  Having already estab-
lished that Google’s AdWords program is best classified as commer-
cial speech,232 the next analytical step is to examine whether requir-
ing Google to “label” its search engine results would survive a 
Constitutional challenge under the commercial speech doctrine. 
B. Eliminating Restraints on Competition Is Always a Substantial 
Governmental Interest 
Sinclair proposes a three-fold regulation requiring search en-
gines to make clear disclosures of its sponsored results.  First, Sinclair 
suggested that search engines should be required to clearly state that 
sponsored results are “paid listings.”233  Second, paid listings should 
be colorfully and spatially separated from unpaid listings.234  Finally, 
paid listings should have at least one other identifiable difference 
from unpaid listings.235  Should the FTC choose to promulgate and 
enforce similar disclosure rules upon search engines, this section 
seeks to provide the agency with the legal doctrine upon which it may 
rely. 
Turning toward the Central Hudson framework, the Unites States 
Supreme Court in that case addressed the issue of whether the New 
York Public Service Commission (Commission) violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment by completely banning promotional adver-
tising by an electrical utility (Utility).236  In 1973, the State of New 
York faced a severe energy shortage, and sought to address the issue 
by limiting a Utility’s ability to induce consumers into purchasing 
electrical services—“[a]ny increase in demand for electricity . . . 
means greater consumption of energy.”237  In confronting this ques-
tion, the Court applied a four-factor test to determine whether the 
 230 Id. § 404. 
 231 See supra text accompanying notes 159–71. 
 232 Supra Part IV. 
 233 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 234 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 235 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 236 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 558 
(1980). 
 237 Id. at 568. 
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Commission’s regulation of advertising passed constitutional mus-
ter.238  By applying the “commonsense” distinction between speech 
“proposing a commercial transaction . . . and other varieties of 
speech”239 which assumedly provide the speaker with more, or per-
haps less, constitutional protection, the Court concluded that the 
Utility’s advertising proposed a commercial transaction.240
The Court reasoned that for speech proposing a commercial 
transaction to merit First Amendment protection, it must neither 
concern unlawful activity nor be misleading.241  Second, the Court 
must determine “whether the asserted governmental interest is sub-
stantial.”242  Third, if the answers to the foregoing questions “yield 
positive answers,”243 then the Court will address whether “the regula-
tion directly advances the governmental interest asserted.”244  Finally, 
the Court must assess whether the regulation is “not more extensive 
than is necessary to serve that interest.”245
The threshold issue for Google would be whether Google’s 
speech—its “opinion” on a matter of public concern materialized as 
placing advertising on its search page—is misleading.  There is an as-
tonishing absence of case law that upholds a speech restriction be-
cause the commercial speech in question was misleading.  However, 
there is at least a compelling argument that Google’s AdWords are 
misleading.  While it is easy to conceptualize a situation where an ad-
vertiser can mislead by making blatantly false statements in its adver-
tising campaign, the argument becomes more nuanced—and per-
haps too tenuous—in the context of Google’s AdWords.  The FTC 
would have to argue that Google, by not clearly delineating between 
its sponsored results and its organic results, misleads consumers of 
the third party product.  This argument is thin because Google is not 
the actual advertiser, even though its speech is commercial.  Google’s 
status as a commercial speaker in this instance does not arise through 
its own advertising campaign; it arises because Google supplies edito-
rial control over the advertising of others.  This fact makes it difficult 
to characterize Google’s speech as more likely to be misleading than 
informative.  Thus, Google’s speech is likely misleading for the pur-
 238 Id. at 567–71. 
 239 Id. at 575. 
 240 Id. at 562. 
 241 Id. at 564. 
 242 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 564. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
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poses of section 5 of the FTC Act, but it is not “misleading” within the 
context of a rigorous Central Hudson analysis, which, if satisfied, would 
allow regulation of the speech provided there is a rational basis.246  
While Google’s AdWords may have a propensity to deceive under the 
FTC Act, it is unlikely to be “misleading” under Central Hudson.  Fur-
ther, there is no indication whatsoever that AdWords concerns illegal 
activity.  Therefore, Google’s AdWords is entitled to some form of 
First Amendment protection, requiring the reviewing court to next 
inquire whether the asserted government action is substantial. 
In determining substantiality, a court could easily analogize Goo-
gle’s speech to Turner Broadcasting247 where the Supreme Court found 
the following important governmental interests: “(1) [p]reserving the 
benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting 
the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of 
sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for televi-
sion programming.”248  Likewise, “[t]he judgment of the legislative 
branch cannot be ignored or undervalued simply because [those 
sought to be regulated] casts its claims under the umbrella of the 
First Amendment.”249  Under Turner the Court further reasoned that 
“assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information 
sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order.”250  As shown 
in Part I of this Comment, by empirical data, and by various other 
commentators, the search engine market teeters on monopoly at the 
most serious end of the spectrum, or is a clearly actualized oligopoly 
at best.  Indeed, “the Government’s interest in eliminating restraints 
on fair competition is always substantial, even when the individuals or 
entities subject to particular regulations are engaged in expressive ac-
tivity protected by the First Amendment.”251  Regardless of whether a 
reviewing court justifies FTC regulation under an economic or an in-
formational rationale, the Government likely has a substantial inter-
est in regulating Google’s AdWords program. 
The next inquiry pursuant to Central Hudson is whether FTC 
regulation of AdWords directly advances the Government’s interest 
in protecting fair competition in a market whose commodity is 
speech.  The appropriate test is whether the proposed regulation will 
 246 Id. 
 247 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). 
 248 Id. 
 249 Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973). 
 250 Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 663. 
 251 Id. (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 143 (1951)) (emphasis 
added). 
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advance the Government’s goal to “a material degree.”252  In defining 
Rhode Island’s evidentiary burden, the Court determined that when 
defending a regulation limiting lawful and truthful liquor price ad-
vertising, the state must show the “advertising ban will significantly re-
duce alcohol consumption.”253  Rhode Island was unsuccessful in 
showing that banning liquor advertisements containing price would 
“mitigate competition and maintain prices at a higher level than 
would prevail in a completely free market.”254  While the Court noted 
that the state’s justification was a reasonable assumption with which it 
agreed, the state failed to meet its evidentiary burden in proving the 
assumption.255
Further, 44 Liquormart struck down a ban on commercial speech 
because “bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech . . . 
usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will re-
spond ‘irrationally’ to the truth.”256  Google’s AdWords program is 
distinguishable from the ban in 44 Liquormart because the FTC would 
not regulate on the assumption that the public is incapable of ration-
ally responding to the truth.  Quite to the contrary, by forcing Google 
to disclose sponsored results the Government seeks not to protect 
consumers from themselves, but to protect consumers from poten-
tially exploitative advertising practices.  The presupposition that 
Google would potentially give the wrong impression as to the rele-
vancy of its search results is far more palatable from a First Amend-
ment perspective than the assumption that consumers are fundamen-
tally irrational. 
The question therefore becomes whether forcing Google to 
make unambiguous disclosures of sponsorship within its search re-
sults will significantly reduce consumer confusion.  The FTC must 
also show that a reduction in consumer confusion will protect fair 
competition in the search engine market by ensuring “widespread 
dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources.”257
As indicated by the Pew Study, one out of every six Internet 
search engine users are unable to distinguish between sponsored and 
non-sponsored results.258  In every instance where a consumer clicks 
on a sponsored result thinking it is an objectively accurate result, the 
 252 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996). 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. at 503. 
 257 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). 
 258 Supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
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user is confused and misled by the advertisement.  A complete disclo-
sure of result sponsorship will significantly reduce the aggregate 
amount of confusion,259 and will likely eliminate confusion amongst 
consumers who are unable to differentiate between Google’s advertis-
ing machine and its organic results.  The question of whether this re-
duction in confusion is substantial will likely turn on an issue of fact.  
But given the substantial number of bewildered searchers, a reduc-
tion by disclosure is likely significant either in the aggregate or on an 
individual basis; however, as this is a question of empirics, it requires 
further study. 
The connection between reduction in the amount of consumer 
confusion and the government’s interest in ensuring widespread dis-
semination of information from a variety of sources is best illustrated 
by a hypothetical.  Suppose Judovin LLC (J) and Goldberg Corpora-
tion (G) are both engaged in the sale of handmade soaps, and both 
solely do business on the Internet.  G manufactures an astonishing 
variety of soaps, but at a lower quality than J, who manufactures the 
finest organic lavender soap in the land.  G, an organization of dubi-
ous ethics, purchases, among other things, the following AdWords: 
“handmade lavender soap,” and “Judovin.”  J does not purchase Ad-
Words. Under the current regime, for a consumer who enters the 
search terms “Judovin” and “handmade soap” or “lavender,” the first 
result on Google would be a link to G’s webpage, and a consumer 
who expects to purchase high quality J soap will be presented with 
the option to purchase lower quality and lower priced G soap.260  Be-
cause the consumer did not receive the information he sought, he 
may never have the opportunity to make an informed choice as to the 
soap he ultimately purchases.  Furthermore, G may have the ability to 
charge supercompetitive prices or prevent new market entry through 
its use of AdWords and the concomitant reverse free-riding rational 
 259 The aggregate confusion is reduced by the ratio of the sum of the number of 
users who cannot distinguish sponsored results and the number of times each con-
fused user is misled by the sponsored results to the overall volume of search engine 
use. 
 260 While there may be a trademark remedy for initial interest confusion on the 
set of facts as presented, the issue is as of yet undecided.  See, e.g., Google, Inc. v. 
American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., C-03-5340, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450, 
*8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007).  Because Judovin is likely a generic mark, this Comment 
assumes the mark has not achieved the secondary meaning necessary to warrant 
trademark protection, and the trademark issue is therefore moot.  Even if a trade-
mark remedy were available, such a remedy would merely represent piecemeal gap-
filling and would only protect the interests of the trademark holder.  Likewise, a 
trademark remedy does not provide predictable consumer protection, nor would it 
forward the Government’s interest in ensuring a diversity of information. 
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described above.261  While the aforementioned micro-scenario is 
clearly whimsical, the impact such practice would have on a macro 
level is significant and ultimately beyond the FTC’s current regulatory 
reach.262  Requiring clear disclosure of sponsored results will reduce 
consumer confusion and, by giving consumers the ability to make an 
informed choice as to whether they wish to view advertising or objec-
tively reliable results, thereby ensure diversity of information and pro-
tect a market whose commodity is speech. 
The final inquiry under Central Hudson is whether the proposed 
regulation is not more extensive than is necessary.  The only way for 
the government to forward its substantial interest in reducing con-
sumer confusion and promoting a diversity of information is to re-
quire sponsorship disclosure.  One arena where regulation by forced 
disclosure served to ensure diversity of information is the payola 
scandal of the 1950’s.263  In response to the practice of radio stations 
accepting money from artists to play their songs on the air, Congress 
enacted 47 U.S.C.  § 317,264 which states: 
all matter broadcast by any radio station for which any money, 
service or other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly 
paid, or promised to or charged or accepted by, the station so 
broadcasting, from any person, shall, at the time the same is so 
broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished, as the case may 
be, by such person.265
The rationale for this legislation was to decrease barriers for new art-
ists wishing access to the radio.266  By attempting to ensure objective 
popularity as the benchmark for radio play, Congress protected con-
sumer’s rights to hear a diversity of music.  The assumption upon 
which § 317 rests is that the only way consumers will know they are 
being presented with sponsored material is to require the recipient of 
the consideration to disclose the transaction to the consumers.267
 261 See supra notes 159–71 and accompanying text. 
 262 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act grants the FTC authority to 
regulate unfair and deceptive acts.  15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (2000).  While the FTC may 
have a course of action against G, under the current state of affairs the FTC would 
not be able to limit Google’s ability to sell AdWords to predatory purchasers because 
Google is not in competition with G.  See id. 
 263 See generally Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 26 (offering a discussion of poten-
tial Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction over Google). 
 264 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2000). 
 265 Id. 
 266 Sarah Greene, Legislative Update: Clear Channel v. Competition Act of 2002: Is There 
a Clear End in Sight?, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 387, 426 (2002). 
 267 See In re Nat’l Broad. Co., 27 F.C.C. 2d 75, 75 (1970) (“The purpose of Section 
317 of the Act . . . is to require that the audience be clearly informed that it is hear-
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In an auditory medium, requiring the disc jockey to announce 
that a certain song was paid for is the only way to communicate the 
necessary information to consumers.  Google’s results page, being a 
visual medium, requires a far more difficult and nuanced solution to 
the problem of whether the regulation is more expansive than is nec-
essary.  Are differences in color between organic and sponsored re-
sults sufficient to alert consumers?268  Is color in combination with 
“paid listing” effective?269  Would the requirement of a discretionary 
third category adequately inform consumers that their results are 
merely advertising?  There are no clear answers without a scientific 
study that finds the balance between what is necessary to promote di-
versity of information and what is unconstitutional forced speech.  
This Comment, while advocating for Governmental regulation of 
search engine practices, therefore cautions the FTC to conduct a 
consumer study before exacting any rules upon Google. 
C. Is Regulating Google a Wise Policy Choice? 
Even though the FTC possesses regulatory jurisdiction over Goo-
gle’s deceptive practices and such governance is not constitutionally 
impermissible, FTC rules may nonetheless be an unwise policy 
choice.  This Comment, even if it could, seeks to do no harm to 
Google.  Google is a tremendous business, which operates at the fore-
front of technology and provides the public with an invaluable ser-
vice.  Google is not evil; to the contrary, it is generally beneficent.  
For example, it provides its programmers with the funding necessary 
to carry out the programmers’ personal projects and requires that 
twenty percent of the programmer’s time be devoted to individual, 
non-Google projects.270  This Comment does however assert that 
Google occupies a critical seat in our society.  Much to humanity’s 
dismay, Google is ultimately a business that potentially harbors objec-
tives and incentives antithetical to the common good.  FTC regula-
tion of Google’s AdWords would not undermine the service Google 
provides; it would enhance and affirm the sacrosanct societal values 
of free speech, informational reliability, and free-market enterprise.  
ing or viewing matter which has been paid for, when such is the case, and that the 
person paying for the broadcast of the matter be clearly identified.”). 
 268 This question is most likely answered in the negative as Google currently and 
voluntarily uses color to distinguish between categories of results, yet consumers are 
still confused. 
 269 Again, Google voluntarily uses spatial and textual devices to distinguish, yet 
confusion abounds. 
 270 Stephen Baker, Google and the Wisdom of Clouds, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 13, 2007, 
at 32. 
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Nor would FTC regulation decrease Google’s economic value.  With 
their deftness at placing Internet advertising, requiring the entire 
search engine market to clearly disclose sponsored results will not 
turn advertisers away from Google.  The regulation will protect the 
information market from slipping into a reality mitigated by advertis-
ing—the simplified operational mode.  We should demand complex-
ity, accuracy, and fair competition in our speech markets.  However, 
there is currently insufficient data that would indicate a present need 
for immediate action.  Future regulation is undoubtedly prudent, but 
hasty action may lead to unintended consequences.  The greatest dis-
service the government could do to our informational nodes is regu-
late them into oblivion.  Without a profit, there is no incentive to 
provide the service.  While the requirement of clear disclosure is only 
a small step towards ensuring informational diversity and autonomy, 
the FTC should remember that discretion is sometimes the better 
part of valor—but it only took one day for the Library of Alexandria 
to burn to the ground. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Internet has the potential to be what our collective uncon-
scious imagined: a truly democratic society that satisfies niche market 
consumers and mainstream tastes alike.  However, the First Amend-
ment assumption that the only way to promote a democracy is by 
permitting speakers unfettered editorial control dissipates in the on-
line arena.  While we should not abandon this assumption through 
piecemeal First Amendment exceptions, we should thoughtfully ap-
ply existing doctrine to new modes of speech.  The Google gate-
keeper, motivated purely by economic interests, should not have un-
regulated control and exclusionary power over our age’s most 
precious nodes of communication.  Conversely, Internet consumers, 
at times both naïve and loyal, are susceptible to confusing “relevancy” 
with “accuracy,” especially when misled by the Google advertising 
machine.  Further, this confusion may lead to an unknown and un-
knowable decline in the quality of information presented to informa-
tion consumers.  Regulation of Google’s deceptive advertising prac-
tices will increase the relevance of search results and thereby ensure 
that searchers are more likely than not to find what they are looking 
for.  As a society dependent on the Internet for making decisions 
from the most trivial to the most pivotal, we must demand relevance 
in search engine results.  By encouraging responsible behavior from 
those entities that dominate and disseminate the information upon 
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which we all rely, we ensure diversity, dependability, and protect the 
Internet from re-forming itself into a simplified operational mode. 
